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Apocalypse Soon? Silver Bullet or Time Suck? Opportunity Costs or Costly Opportunities? Is Kosovo the Beginning and the End? Such precisions would likely reveal that the French and the Germans already have significantly different interpretations of a European army which would be worth addressing. But, if the concept is a more substantive target for the current European defence procurement and coordination programmes, it is high time that European leaders explained what it would look like in greater detail.
Der Konflikt zwischen Russland und der Ukraine hat sich nun auch auf die Religion ausgeweitet. Andrew Wilson berichtet, dass die orthodoxe Kirche der Ukraine auf einer Bischofskonferenz Schritte unternommen habe, um sich von der russisch-orthodoxen Kirche abzuspalten.
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It will add religion to language, war, and patriotism as factors consolidating Ukrainian national identity since Poroshenko thinks it will help sway his re-election in So catastrophic, in fact, that the Russian church is hardly likely to acquiesce quietly in the loss. Secondly, great power politics is transforming the multilateral system. The German strategic debate has yet to adapt to any of these challenges. Admittedly, neither Germany nor Europe has broken down under the pressure. Mariupol itself is indeed known across the world: Russian-backed forces seized it in bitter fighting in , but later relinquished it.
Mariupol has since become a symbol of Ukrainian resistance. But Russia is now increasingly militarising the Sea of Azov in a series of moves that could have implications not only for maritime trade and supplies into Ukraine, but also for the ongoing land war in eastern Ukraine. The UN may soon need to take steps to stabilise the region. Nach Ansicht von Ulrike Esther Franke hat Deutschland seinen Platz in der internationalen Gemeinschaft aus sicherheitspolitischer Perspektive immer noch nicht gefunden.
The official German narrative, which is widely believed in government ministries or at least propagated by them , is that ever since the Kosovo war in the late s, Germany has been slowly but steadily emerging as an engaged and reliable actor on the international scene. Because outside Germany, observers are considerably less convinced. In fact, there is more than enough disappointment to go around, and the story told sounds quite different.
Given that perceptions shape reality, Tehran will not budge in Syria so long as its opponents aspire to impose a complete defeat upon it. Despite the growing tensions, this accommodation may still be feasible — so long as expectations are realistically lowered by delinking immediate priorities from the maximalist ambition of a full Iranian withdrawal. For the United States and Israel, core security interests do not require that Syria be cleared of every last Iranian.
From its perspective, Tehran might benefit from an arrangement that does not threaten its wider position alongside Assad and that avoids costly escalation. This renewed strategy should aim to create a virtuous cycle by locking in gains made in governance and service delivery, enabling economic recovery, and assisting a move towards greater security and more meaningful and effective political processes. The ineffectual GNA and corrupt legacy of the Gaddafi years mean that the best way to achieve this comes from local actors, be they municipalities, state-owned companies, or private sector initiatives.
This wider strategy will need to be responsive to the structural economic flaws of the Libyan state which hamper stabilisation and encourage destructive, destabilising politics. One feels confident at this point that such critiques will persist at least as long as the US trade deficit with Europe. Of course, Europeans need to get their house in order in defence. But that effort has little to do with symbolic defence spending targets and even less to do with the impossible task of satisfying Trump.
Rather, they should focus on creating a truly independent defence capability. That effort probably does involve more spending, but more importantly it means creating a European military capability that can stand on its own. Such a capability will allow the Europeans to negotiate with Trump, and future American presidents, from a position of equality.
Of course, this raises questions about whether Chinese experts adopt these positions because they sense opportunities to exploit, or because they take Trump seriously — including the announced backlash against China. However, this edition of China Analysis indicates that the second interpretation is more accurate. The EU should place an updated idea of liberal order at the centre of its Global Strategy, and build the capacity to implement this strategy. In doing so, the EU should follow an approach that aims to reconcile some of the tensions between sovereignty and international order that have become problematic in recent years due to the rise of assertive illiberal powers, inconsistencies in Western practice, and a pervasive belief among Western electorates that globalisation is more a threat than an opportunity.
Three other populists follow her in the polls. Poroshenko may only need to gain a vote share of between 10 percent and 20 percent in the first round of the election. The final part of his strategy is to face an opponent who can be easily defeated in the second round. As recently as two years ago, Tymoshenko was such a candidate.
At the time, most observers believed that her record as prime minister before the election would limit her vote share.
1st Things 1st: Serving
But, if the polls are accurate, Ukrainians seem to have short memories: her stock has continued to rise. Given the centrality of the Middle East as a stage for France and a place of heightened interest for Europe more generally, the region provides a key test case for realising this ambition. Yet any renewed European endeavour by France will succeed only if its fellow EU member states come to terms with the need for Europe to play a growing and more assertive role in the region. Other key European states also need to support a more assertive, more comprehensive and more strategic European policy in the Middle East.
These states include Germany, Italy, Spain, and even the UK — in spite of Brexit — as well as other partners that understand the importance of what is at stake in the region, from Sweden to the Netherlands. Germany in particular needs to continue its current evolution toward greater activism in the region, and to recognise that its interests cannot be defined only through commercial ties or refugee containment. Much now depends on whether or not the Afrin battle is the prelude to a deepening Kurdish-Turkish conflict.
Both crises cast doubt on European presumptions. Both could be decided by fire and fury, rather than the usual European gloss of political incentives and economic opportunities.
The Law of Development Cooperation
The Europeans now find themselves at a loss in the geopolitical struggle between Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey that emerged from the ruins of Iraq and Syria. This regional cleavage is a new layer under the global power struggle between Russia, the United States, and China. Thus old-fashioned power politics has returned to the 21st century.
And Germans, like most of their European partners, have no clue what to do.
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They have placed all their hopes and bets on the supremacy of international law and cooperation over national interest and naked power. Berlin needs a new foreign policy. Like in Moldova before, the private enrichment of ostensibly 'pro-European' politicians will only discredit the Union, diminish its influence and derail the reform process within the country. The EU therefore needs to act now if it wants to maintain credibility in the Eastern Neighbourhood. But this hesitation is misplaced. Corruption and sovereignty are distinct issues which must be treated as such.
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Geopolitische Schwerpunkte 2. USA 2. Naher und Mittlerer Osten, Maghreb 2. Zentral- und Ostasien 2.